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Executive Summary
Wireless and ad hoc communication systems create additional challenges for
the implementation of security and reliability services when compared to fixed
networks. On the one hand, the inherent characteristics of wireless environment
contribute serious system vulnerabilities if the security requirements are not met.
On the other hand, the mobility pattern as well as resource constraints of ad
hoc devices make security design more difficult.
The principal objective of SWACOM project (Secure and Reliable Wireless and
Ad Hoc Communications) is to analyze vulnerabilities and develop mechanisms
to provide security and reliability in wireless communication networks. A par-
ticular focus is on large scale distributed ad hoc networks, which are used in
many civilian and military applications.
The work contained in this PhD thesis aims to investigate and develop solutions
for providing secure and reliable wireless and ad hoc communications. The
research goals of this PhD work are:
• Goal 1: To collect knowledge that forms a foundation for security and
reliability in wireless communications, especially communication in ad hoc
networks.
• Goal 2: To create solutions for securing and providing reliable wireless
communication services, especially for ad hoc network applications.
This PhD project contains a number of distinct, but related works tied to SWA-
COM project research theme. The main contributions of this thesis are:
• Contribution 1: Propose an alternative approach to secure wireless and
ad hoc communications by using identity-based cryptography. Paper A
introduces a new application of identity-based cryptography to replace
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current ZigBee security solution, while Paper B proposes an application
of identity-based cryptography to secure a distributed electronic payment
scheme using mobile phones.
• Contribution 2: Propose a routing algorithm to provide reliable com-
munications for underwater sensor networks. Sensor devices running our
algorithm can actively move out of shadow zones areas, which causes net-
work disconnection, to keep themselves connected. The solution helps to
increase the availability and reliability of underwater sensor network oper-
ations. This contribution is presented in Paper C.
• Contribution 3: Propose a new secure multicast routing algorithm to
increase energy efficiency in actuator and sensor networks. We use existing
security building blocks for providing security services while introducing a
new solution for reducing energy consumption for multicast communication
in sensor and actuator networks. Paper D presents this work.
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is an introduction that
contains two chapters while the second part is a collection of papers, which
consists of four papers.
Chapter 1 presents the background and motivation for this PhD research. In
this chapter, we briefly review the security for wireless and ad hoc networks,
as well as the use of identity-based cryptography to simplify security imple-
mentations. We also discuss security and reliability issues in sensor networks,
including underwater sensors with different characteristics. Chapter 2 summa-
rizes paper contents and presents contributions of our papers. This chapter ends
with conclusions and discussion of open problems.
Four papers in Part II are grouped into two categories. Paper A and B are
the applications of identity-based cryptography for securing wireless and ad hoc
applications. Paper C and D are solutions for secure and reliable communications
in wireless sensor networks.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Wireless communications has played an important role in daily life since its
introduction. It can be used in cellular networks, short-range communication
networks, e.g. Bluetooth, WiFi, remote control systems, security systems for
home and office buildings etc. Among the applications of wireless communication
technology, cellular telephony is the most popular. With the advantages of
mobility and flexibility, it offers us communications on-the-go. More over, as the
mobile devices are getting smarter and more powerful, which can be used for
communication, entertainment and business tools, they quickly become integral
part of our daily life.
Another application domain of wireless communication is wireless ad hoc net-
working, which can be used to set up temporary and flexible networks. Wireless
ad hoc networking can be useful in monitoring and control applications, disaster
relief operations, or military area surveillance etc. A wireless sensor network is
an application that uses wireless ad hoc networking technology where a large
number of small sensor nodes are deployed closed to the phenomenon to be ob-
served. Those sensor nodes work in ad hoc manner with additional and more
stringent constraints. With many advantages that it provides, the use of wireless
ad hoc networking has become pervasive.
The use of wireless communication technology introduces more challenges com-
pared to that of fixed networks. The wireless medium is not only easier to
eavesdrop on than guided media, it is also susceptible to jamming and other
kinds of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. These problems raise serious secu-
rity challenges. Moreover, nodes in wireless networks are often mobile, which
also introduces availability and reliability challenges as the nodes may be out of
network coverage.
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4 Introduction
In ad hoc networks, there are even more challenges because these networks are
infrastructureless and follow a multihop communication pattern, which is harder
to manage and to provide security services. Ad hoc and especially sensor devices
also suffer from limited resource constraints. These limitations make deploying
security and reliability solutions in ad hoc networks even more difficult.
There are many security solutions used for existing wireless networks. For ex-
ample, the cellular networks have a set of standards, which includes security
specifications and implementations that provide the underlying security. Ad
hoc networks, despite of their immaturity, also have security features to provide
security and reliability services.
Even though security services are widely used in cellular networks and also exist
in some ad hoc network applications, there is still a significant requirement for
security and reliability research. The use of new technologies or a combination
of existing technologies may offer better and/or convenient services to current
wireless network users. In the case of ad hoc networks, current security and
reliability solutions are often application-specific and there are still unexplored
areas.
The main objectives of this PhD thesis is to investigate security and reliability
issues in wireless and ad hoc communications and aims at providing solutions
to contribute to different aspects of secure and reliable wireless and ad hoc
communications. Our particular focuses are in two sub domains: identity-based
cryptography for securing wireless network security; and routing algorithms for
secure and reliable sensor network communications.
The following section presents some background about the fields that related to
our research.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Wireless Network Vulnerabilities
Conventional wireless networks are primarily used for personal communications.
In these systems, end-devices are used by human beings to communicate with
other human beings or with service providers. The network architecture is cen-
tralized where end-devices connect to service providers’ infrastructures and trust
the service operators. There is no direct communication among end-devices.
Examples of current wireless networks are WiFi, Bluetooth, and GSM/UMTS
cellular networks.
These wireless networks are different from fixed networks in the way commu-
nication takes place. Thus they suffer from additional security and reliability
problems compared to wired networks.
The first difference in wireless networks is that communication between nodes
takes place using a wireless channel. That channel suffers from a number of
vulnerabilities [10]. The following list shows typical vulnerabilities of a wireless
i
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Background 5
channel. Though these vulnerabilities also exist in a fixed communication line,
they are more severe in a wireless channel:
• Eavesdropping: information that the victim transmits or receives can be
overheard by placing a receiver in proximity or by using a high sensitivity
receiver from a distance. Eavesdropping is often used to collect information
for later use.
• Integrity violation: the content of messages exchanged between commu-
nication parties can be captured and modified.
• Impersonation: an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user. Though
this vulnerability also exists in wired networks, it is even easier for the
attacker to use this kind of attack in wireless environments.
• Jamming: an attacker can jam the radio channel for a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. For example, the attacker can transmit at the same time
the victim transmits or receives data to create collisions. This can even be
done from a long distance with high power transmitters.
The second difference of wireless networks that may affect to security and relia-
bility is that the devices are small and usually mobile, which introduces several
challenges compared to fixed networks.
• Privacy: when users move, their devices’ locations can be used to trace
their whereabouts and disclose their privacy. This means that the specific
location at specific point of time of the users can be revealed.
• Availability: wireless environments might change as users move. This
may cause service disruption when users move from a place where service
is available to a place without service.
• Resource constraint: mobile devices are often small and have limited
storage, computing power, and energy. Energy limitation is the most signif-
icant among these constraints. Conserving energy by reducing the number
of operations performed by the devices can however result in worse security
protocols.
Besides conventional wireless networks, which have centralized architecture, there
are also ad hoc networks with decentralized architecture. A special kind of ad
hoc networks is sensor network where a large number of small sensors are used
for monitoring, surveillance and control applications. Those devices are limited
in the capability and resources.
The use of ad hoc networks introduces new decentralized and even self-organized
architectures where roles of service providers are limited or eliminated. The net-
work consists of peer nodes relaying traffic for one another. Thus, it forms a
multi-hop communication pattern. Also, devices in sensor networks have very
i
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6 Introduction
limited resources and provide limited computing and communication capabil-
ities. Thus, ad hoc networks introduce new security challenges compared to
conventional wireless networks.
The following features make ad hoc and sensor networks more vulnerable than
traditional networks [20]:
• Infrastructureless: in a general ad hoc network, there is normally no
trusted central point where network devices can connect to. In sensor net-
works, there exists base stations and/or sinks, which can be considered
central points. However, the communication among sensor nodes is per-
formed in a multi-hop manner where security of one node may affect that
of others. This means that designing a security solution for ad hoc and sen-
sor networks is more difficult since it should rely on a distributed scheme
instead of a centralized scheme as in conventional wireless networks.
• More vulnerable wireless link: link layer protocols in ad hoc networks
rely on trusted and cooperative behaviors of neighbor nodes which might
be suffer from selfish behaviors or abuses.
• Multi-hop communication: data packets follow multihop routes and
pass through different network nodes before arriving at their destinations.
Due to the possible untrustworthy behaviors of relaying nodes, this feature
presents a serious vulnerability because security of one node may affect
security of other nodes.
• Mobile node: though nodes in conventional wireless networks also move,
node mobility in ad hoc networks introduces more severe effects. As a node
might behave as a relay node to pass its neighbor’s traffic to the sink, its
mobility creates a connection problem when its neighbor cannot find an
uplink node to send data to the sink.
• Topology change: node mobility, unstable wireless connectivity, and
power constraint can be different sources that affect node and link avail-
ability. Therefore, network topology might change frequently.
• Resource constraint: Ad hoc network devices are small with limited re-
sources. This limitation causes vulnerabilities where attackers may deplete
a node’s energy to create network partitioning. Also, security solutions
that require high computational complexity are difficult to be implemented
with the above resource constraints. This is especially true in the case of
sensor networks.
• Physical vulnerability: ad hoc and sensor nodes are small and portable.
Thus, they can be stolen and reverse engineered to get secret information.
This information can later be used to compromise other nodes.
Security Requirements
Basic security requirements, including those for existing wired and wireless net-
works, that a security provider need to provide are:
i
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Confidentiality This might be the most important aspect in network security.
Encryption is the common practice to provide confidentiality service.
Integrity While confidentiality protects data from being disclosed, it does not
protect data from being changed by the attackers. This change of data may
harm the system if not prevented or detected. Data integrity ensures that data
has not been altered in transit.
Authentication An attacker might not just alter the content of data packets.
He can also inject additional packets for malicious purposes. Authentication
guarantees that the received data comes from a legitimate source and the party
at the other side of the communication channel is the one he claims to be.
Access control This service protects the infrastructure from unauthorized
access. For example, the use of firewalls to protect internal networks from the
outside accesses.
Non-repudation This service prevents a communication party from denying
that he has actually involved in the transactions. Non-repudiation service is
often associated with public-key cryptography.
Beside general security requirements, ad hoc and especially sensor networks also
add additional requirements [67]. Those requirements also exist in traditional
security models. However, we mention them here under ad hoc network security
requirements as we consider they are crucial for the operation of those networks.
Self-organization Every node need to be self-organizing and self-healing ac-
cording to different situations because there is no fixed infrastructure available
for network management. This feature introduces a challenge to security in ad
hoc networks. For instance, when a sensor node is dead due to energy depletion,
other nodes must still be able to operate normally.
Clock synchronization Most of sensor network applications rely on some
form of clock synchronization. The precise clock is needed for many operations,
for example, to decide when the sensor node is going to sleep and when it will
awake. The clock can also be used to calculate end-to-end delay when trans-
mitting packets between nodes. Thus, clock synchronization plays an important
role for the correct and efficient operations.
Secure and reliable localization A node in ad hoc networks needs to know
the location of its neighbors, or at least, who its neighbors are, in order to
route packets. If this information is not correct, network operation might be
malfunctioned or network security might be violated.
In summary, wireless networks in general and ad hoc networks in particular
suffer from more security and reliability problems than fixed networks. This is
due to the wireless medium environment, the communication pattern and the
characteristics of wireless devices.
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1.1.2 Identity-Based Cryptography
This section presents a brief introduction about identity-based cryptography,
which is used as a building block for our proposals to secure wireless and ad hoc
communications in Paper A and B. In this section, we first briefly present sym-
metric and public-cryptography, and then introduce identity-based cryptography
and its applications.
Symmetric and Public-key Cryptography
A general model for communication security contains a sender, who sends mes-
sages, a recipient, who receives the transmitted messages, and an opponent, who
tries to attack and violates the confidentiality, authenticity etc., of the transac-
tion by manipulating the transmitted messages. Figure 1.1 [60] presents such a
model.
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(e.g., arbiter, distributor
or secret information)
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Figure 1.1: Model for network security.
To protect transactions from being compromised by the opponent, the two com-
munication parties have to establish a set of security techniques to secure their
communication. As described in [60], all techniques for providing security have
two components:
• A security-related transformation: this will be applied to the mes-
sages to be sent. Examples of the transformation are encryption algo-
rithms used to scramble messages to make them unreadable before send-
ing and thus, prevent the opponent from observing the exact content. At
the other side, appropriate decryption algorithms are used to de-scramble
the received messages to make them readable to the recipient. A possible
authentication code can be added to verify the identity of the sender.
• A shared secret information: this information should be shared, by
some ways between the two communication parties and be kept secret
from the opponent. An example is a secret key shared between parties in
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a symmetric encryption scheme. There might be a trusted third party to
work as the distributor of the secret information.
Cryptography1 is probably the most important aspect of communication secu-
rity. It can be divided into symmetric-key and asymmetric-key cryptography,
or secret-key and public-key cryptography. Symmetric-key cryptography was
invented thousands of years ago and was the only form of cryptography until
1976, when public-key cryptography was first introduced [19].
Symmetric cryptography is a form of cryptosystems where the encryption and de-
cryption are performed with the same secret key. The key is distributed between
two parties securely, i.e. from the opponent perspective, by direct communica-
tions or with the help of a trusted third party. Symmetric cryptography is again
divided into block cipher and stream cipher. Figure 1.2 presents a model for a
symmetric cryptosystem, which is adapted from [60].
Cleartext EncryptionAlgorithm
Decryption
Algorithm Cleartext
Ciphertext
Opponent
Information
channel
Sender Recipient
Key Source
Secure channel
Figure 1.2: Model for conventional cryptosystem.
The main advantage of symmetric cipher is its speed and performance over a later
introduced public-key cryptography. However, one of its main disadvantages is
key management process, which relates to secret key distribution. This may
create a number of problems:
• Requirement for a secure channel: to establish a shared secret key
between two parties, there must exist secure channels between them. If
secure channels do not exist between two parties or between each party
and a trusted third party, secure key delivery is impossible.
• Requirement for a number of keys: for two parties to communicate
securely, there need to have at least one secret key shared between them.
However, if the communication involves a number of parties, the number
of secret keys required for them to communicate secretly increase as the
square of the number of parties, unless a trusted third party is involved.
1For simplicity, we might use the words cryptography, cipher and encryption/decryption
interchangeably. In the situations where clarification is needed, we will mention each concept
clearly.
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• Requirement for a trusted third party: to increase the feasibility of
the symmetric cryptography for a network with large number of parties, a
trusted third party is introduced. This party shares secret key with each
of the other parties. The trusted third party will to help establishing a
secure channel when other two parties want to communicate but there is
no shared key between them. This approach reduce the number of shared
secret keys needed. However, this trusted third party might be a bottleneck
in the network.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [19] presented a seminal paper introducing a no-
tion of public-key cryptography (PKC). The phrase public-key means that two
communication parties can share “secret information” without using a pre-
established secure channel.
The phrase “secret information” mentioned here does not mean a real common
secret key shared by the two parties as in symmetric cryptography case. Each
communication party, in fact, holds its old secret piece of information as its
private key2, which might be different from the other’s. The two parties then
commonly agree to an encryption key, i.e. a public key, to encrypt the transmit-
ted messages that both parties can use their own private key to decrypt. This
is obtained based on a very nice mathematical feature that makes public-key
cryptography the most significant advance in 3000 years history of cryptography
[60]. An example of public-key cryptography, a RSA algorithm [54], is presented
in Table 1.1.
Public Key: a pair n and e where
n: product of two primes, p and q (p and q must remain secret)
e: relatively prime to (p− 1)(q − 1)
Private Key: d where
d = e−1 mod ((p− 1)(q − 1))
Encryption:
c = me mod n where m is the plaintext to encrypt, c is the ciphertext
Decryption:
m = cd mod n
Table 1.1: RSA algorithm
The security of public-key cryptosystem is based on the computational com-
plexity of hard problems, for example, the integer factorization problem of the
RSA algorithm, or the discrete logarithm problem of Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
or number theoretic problem involving elliptic curves in elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy.
In addition to encryption/decryption, PKC also provides digital signature fea-
ture. A digital signature is unique and attached to the party that generates it,
easy to produce and difficult to forge. It is also tied to the message that the
2For clarity purpose, the word “secret key” is understood as a shared secret key between
parties in symmetric key cryptography while the word “private key” is understood as own
secret decryption key kept by each party in public-key cryptography.
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
Background 11
sending party signs. Digital signature helps to solve the problem of authentic-
ity, i.e. to prove that a communication party is an entity it claims to be, and
non-repudiation, i.e. to prevent a party from denying that it has performed
the transactions. Digital signature is a crucial part of public key infrastructure
operations as well as many other network security schemes.
Figure 1.3 [60] presents a model of public-key cryptosystem where both secrecy,
i.e. encryption/decryption, and authentication are performed. The sender A
first signs his message by his private key, and then encrypts it with the recipient
B’s public key before sending. When the recipient B receives the message, he
first decrypts it using his private key and then verify the message by the public
key of the sender A.
Cleartext EncryptionAlgorithm
Decryption
Algorithm Cleartext
Ciphertext
Opponent
Information
channel
Sender A Recipient B
Key Pair 
Source A
Hash & 
Encryption
Decryption &
Comparison
Key Pair 
Source B
Private 
Key A
Private 
Key B
Public
Key B
Public 
Key A
Figure 1.3: Model for public-key cryptosystem.
Though PKC have many nice features over symmetric cryptography, its opera-
tions are more computationally expensive than those used in symmetric cryp-
tography. As a consequence, PKC and symmetric cryptography often co-exist
in a hybrid system and work together to achieve final security goals. For ex-
ample, the message is encrypted using symmetric algorithm, while the message
encryption/decryption key is encrypted using the public-key algorithm and sent
together with the message.
Identity-Based Cryptography
Identity-based cryptography (IBC), invented by Adi Shamir in 1984 [58], is a
special form of PKC where a communication party can use its unique identity
together with global parameters to form its public key. An identity-based cryp-
tosystem consists of a key generation center, i.e. private key generator or PKG,
which is in charge of setting up global parameters and issuing private key associ-
ated with specific identity. Users can then use global parameters and an identity
to generate a public key for that identity. The exchange of public key is simply
the exchange of the unique identity.
IBC makes the use of PKC more convenient as it might eliminate the use of cer-
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tificates in PKC because the party’s identity can be easily verified. For example,
one can use the other party’s email address or mobile phone number (suppose
that they are unique and authentic) to generate the public-key and use that key
to encrypt messages sent to the other party.
The advantages of IBC over PKC are:
• There is no need to maintain a public-key directory, as the public keys are
based on identity information widely known by other parties.
• Secure communications can be done even before the recipients obtain pri-
vate keys from PKG. In this case, the recipient, having received the en-
crypted messages, will contact the PKG to get a private key associated
with its identity information to decrypt the message.
IBC also has inherent problems, for example key revocation, which can be de-
scribed as follow. When a communication party uses its unique identity to form
its public key and has a private key associated with that information, a serious
problem appears if the private key is compromised. The common behavior is to
replace public/private key pairs. However, the public key is associated with that
party’s identity which is hard to change. The public key is also influenced by
the service provider’s public parameters while those parameters are also hard to
change as they will affect other users. A simple solution to overcome this prob-
lem is to use a private key with attached expiration time, which will become
invalid after certain time.
The working principles of identity-based encryption and signature schemes are
presented in Figure 1.4 which resembles the figures in our Paper A and B.
Identity-Based Cryptography Applications
IBC is particularly useful when the communication parties are human beings.
In this case, instead of exchanging public keys, which are often a long string of
ASCII characters, they only need to exchange email addresses or phone numbers
to generate public keys. This is also easier to verify the authenticity of these
identities.
There are some existing solutions to offer IBC services. Voltage Security [66] has
developed an IBC solution for securing emails in which they use email addresses
to form public key to encrypt emails. There is also a prototype of securing SMS
messages using IBC, as described in [33] and [34], where SMS sent are encrypted
by using the recipient’s mobile number to form a public key. As mobile phones
become an indispensable part of our daily life, the use of IBC for mobile phones
is a promising application in the future.
Identity management, which is another research topic under SWACOM project,
can also be used together with IBC to provide more convenient and secure so-
lutions.
However, in order for IBC to be integrated and used efficiently in small, resource-
constrained devices, there is a need for improvements on the efficiency of IBC.
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Figure 1.4: Identity-based encryption and signature scheme.
Current IBC solutions based on weil pairings [8] is believed to be too computa-
tionally expensive for small devices.
Paper A and B present our works related to IBC. Paper A proposes an ideas to
apply IBC for securing ZigBee communication, which can be use in smart home
applications. Paper B is a proposal of IBC application to secure mobile payment
using mobile phones as the end devices.
1.1.3 Secure Routing for Wireless Sensor Networks
Sensor networks are used in civilian and military applications. They can be used
for animal tracking, environment monitoring or disaster relief. They can also
be used for military applications like monitoring and surveillance. Security and
reliability is therefore very important for them.
Sensor network devices, however, suffer from many constraints, including low
computation capability, limited memory and energy supply, susceptibility to
physical capture. They also use insecure wireless channels as a form of commu-
nication. These constraints make designing security and reliability solutions for
sensor networks a big challenge.
Part of this PhD work aims at develop secure and reliable routing solutions for
sensor networks. We work on both conventional sensor networks3, which use
3The phrase “sensor network” in general is to represent both conventional sensor network
using radio frequency and underwater sensor network using acoustic signals for communication.
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radio frequency, and underwater sensor networks, which use acoustic signals for
communication. This section aims to provide an overview of related fields used
as the foundation for our work presented in Paper C and D. We first presents the
obstacles that make designing sensor network security difficult. We then discuss
the conventional secure routing problems in sensor networks. After that, we give
a brief review of some issues that distinguishes underwater sensor networks from
conventional sensor networks.
Sensor Network Security Obstacles
As mentioned above, sensor devices are limited in resources which makes design-
ing security solutions for them difficult. The two main obstacles in providing
security for sensor networks are presented as follow:
• Very limited resources: security operations require a certain amount of
resources for the implementation, for example, memory space, processing
power and energy. However, these resources are very limited in a wireless
sensor device.
• Unreliable communication: security of the network relies heavily on
a network protocol, which in turn depends on communication. However,
the communication in sensor network is not reliable. Some characteristics
that contribute to the unreliable operations of sensor networks are wireless
channel unreliability, collisions, multihop communication pattern, network
latency and congestion, and lost of clock synchronization. These charac-
teristics are even more severe in underwater sensor networks, which uses
acoustic signals for communication.
Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks
An overview of secure routing for conventional wireless sensor networks can be
found in [36]. Other sources of references include [13], [20], and [67].
Attacks on Sensor Network Routing Protocols As discussed in [36], rout-
ing protocols for sensor network are quite simple and are susceptible to attacks.
Below are different kinds of attacks on sensor network routing protocols.
• Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information: in this kind
of attack, the attackers target at routing information exchanged between
network nodes. By manipulating this routing information, the attackers
can create routing loops, disable a legitimate route, generate false alarm
messages or partition the whole network.
However, in most cases we use this phrase to mention conventional sensor network without
confusions. In case clarification is needed, we will use the prefixes, “conventional” for RF
sensor networks, and “acoustic” for underwater sensor networks
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• Selective forwarding: this attack can be launched by an attacker con-
trolling a malicious node. This node selectively forwards or drops packets
passing through it. This kind of attack targets specific nodes, degrades or
creates false perception about network quality.
• Sinkhole attack: this attack has a goal to attract surrounding traffic
to a malicious node. The attacker does this by instructing the node to
broadcast good routing information, for example, to let other nodes know
that it has low delay and hop count to the sink and thus provides a better
route. The traffic destined to the malicious node is subsequently dropped
or processed by the attacker with a much more powerful device attached
to that node.
• Sybil attack: in Sybil attack, a single malicious node may represent mul-
tiple identities in the network. Those identities then “cooperate” to pro-
vide false information about the network state, thus, assisting the attacker
in luring authentic sensor nodes. Sybil attack increases the influence of
malicious nodes in the network.
• Wormhole attack: in wormhole attack, the attacker creates a tunnel
to route traffic from one part of the network to the other. Normally,
two malicious nodes located at two ends of the tunnel will attract traffic
from the surrounding areas and route through the tunnel, which is under
the attacker’s control. The attacker can process the collected traffic for
malicious purposes or just simply drop traffic to disrupt network operation.
• HELLO flood attack: the attacker in HELLO flood attack simply uses
a high power transmitter to broadcast a HELLO message contain informa-
tion about high-quality route to every node in the network. The faraway
nodes cannot send the data packets to the attacker due to their limited
transmission power. They, however, are also confused about routing infor-
mation as their neighbors, who are also receivers of HELLO flood messages,
perceive the same information.
• Acknowledgment spoofing attack: in this attack, the attacker generate
an acknowledgment even if the previous transaction is not successful. The
goal of acknowledgment spoofing is to provide wrong information to the
victim, e.g. a link quality is higher than it actually is or a dead node is
alive.
Attack Countermeasures There have been many researches working on so-
lutions for tackling the above attacks. One approach to provide a countermeasure
against selective forwarding attack is to use multipath routing [42] in which a
message is forwarded through a number of disjoint paths. In order to launch se-
lective forwarding, the attacker need to control at least one node on each disjoint
path. This approach is a very good solution against selective forwarding with the
trade-off of high communication overhead. The countermeasure to Sybil attack
is to prevent the attacker from using the identities of non-compromised nodes.
This prevention can be done by identity verification with the assistance from
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the base station4. A pair of nodes, after verifying each other, establish a shared
key. In the mean time, the base station can limit the number of neighbors,
and shared keys, that a node can have. Thus, the compromised node can only
communicate with its neighbors. Work in [32] presents a technique for detecting
wormhole attacks in ad hoc network routing. This approach, however, requires
strict clock synchronization between network nodes. Another approach that help
tackles sinkhole and wormhole attacks is geographic routing protocol in which
the locations of nodes are known and used to detect such attacks. A simple way
to prevent from HELLO flood attacks is to verify the communication channel
bidirectionally before accepting a link as legitimate. This approach is, however,
not always practical if the attacker has both a powerful transmitter and a high
sensitivity receiver. Another approach to overcome this problem is to request
neighbor nodes to authenticate each other similar to the case of sinkhole and
wormhole attack prevention.
There are also other countermeasures for securing sensor network routing. Each
has its own advantages and disadvantages and is used based on specific require-
ments. As sensor devices are highly resource-limited, it is very hard to design a
general purpose security solution that satisfies all the requirements.
Our work in Paper D introduces a solution to secure multicast routing in sensor
networks. We use existing key pre-distribution schemes to provide confidentiality
among nodes and use authenticated broadcast presented in [53] for authenticated
interest dissemination. Thus, it helps preventing malicious nodes from injecting
erroneous and incorrect routing information.
Secure and Reliable Routing in Underwater Sensor Networks
The above section presents attacks and countermeasures for secure routing in
sensor networks, which is typically true for conventional sensor networks. There
is, however, another application domain of sensor networks, i.e. underwater
monitoring and surveillance, with additional and different properties. Thus,
underwater sensor networking introduces new research challenges though similar
aspects in conventional sensor networks have been well-addressed.
Underwater Sensor Networks Similar to conventional sensor networks, un-
derwater sensor networks [2] are used for monitoring and surveillance operations
in underwater environment. For examples, the underwater sensor networks can
be used to monitor sea floor, fishing farms or to protect harbors. They can be
used to assist environment protection, disaster prevention, undersea exploration
as well as support military applications. They can be either fixed or mobile.
Figure 1.5 represents a fixed underwater sensor network while Figure 1.6 repre-
sents two mobile underwater sensor networks, one uses radio frequency and the
4In security perspective, a base station is the central point of a sensor network that all
nodes can trust. In the mean time, a sink is a node that receives and processes the sensing
information from sensor nodes. A base station and a sink differ in their functionality in the
sensor network, though they can exist in the same physical device.
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Figure 1.5: Fixed underwater sensor network
(a) RF M-WUSN (b) Acoustic M-WUSN
Figure 1.6: Mobile underwater sensor network
other use acoustic signal for communication. The figures have been taken from
our Paper C.
The communication in underwater sensor networks can be done in different ways.
In the first approach, the sensing devices are underwater that conduct the sensing
tasks. Those devices are connected with a buoy floating on the sea surface. The
sensed data is transmitted via wired connection from the sensing module to the
communication module placed in the buoy. The buoys then communicate with
each other using radio frequency similar to conventional sensor networks. This
approach however, is not always applicable as it needs to deploy a large numbers
of buoys on the sea surface. There might also a communication problem that
affect reliability as the buoys are not always within the line-of-sight of others
due to the influences of sea waves.
In the second approach, both the sensing and communication modules of a sensor
node are underwater. Sensor nodes communicate with one another by acoustic
signal, as radio frequency signal cannot transmit far in underwater environment.
This second approach is a preferred choice for deploying a wireless underwater
sensor networks. When mentioning a underwater sensor network, we mean wire-
less underwater sensor network using acoustic signal as a form of communication.
The differences between conventional and underwater sensor networks that form
the major challenges of underwater sensor network communication are as follow:
Limited bandwidth As a underwater sensor uses acoustic signal, the avail-
able bandwidth is narrower than that of a conventional RF-based sensor. Thus,
it reduces the data rate that can be sent. It may also affect the techniques that
can be used to avoid link layer collisions, e.g. bandwidth partitioning.
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Low quality channel Underwater channels has much lower quality compare
to those of a conventional wireless channel. This low quality is due to the
inherent characteristics of the underwater environment as well as other external
influences, e.g. fish, tide etc., which leads to higher bit error rate (BER).
Low signal speed The acoustic signal speed is 105 times slower than that of
radio frequency. Thus, the propagation delay in underwater sensor network is
considerably higher than in conventional sensor network. This not only affects
the overall delay but also affects the MAC performance in underwater networking
as it may generate higher frequency of collisions.
Device failure Underwater devices are prone to failure and hard to replace.
Thus, the cost for underwater sensors are higher than that for conventional
sensor networks. The maintenance tasks are also more difficult.
Due to the differences in the working environment, underwater sensor networking
introduces new research challenges even though some similar aspects in conven-
tional sensor networks have been well-addressed.
Security and Reliability in Underwater Sensor Networks Underwa-
ter sensor networks suffer from the same security and reliability problem as
conventional sensor networks. Moreover, due to the differences in the working
environment as mentioned above, underwater sensor networking is exposed to
additional challenges.
1. The first set of new security and reliability problems in underwater net-
works is due to the changes in the environment, i.e. low channel quality
and high propagation delay. While the former requires designing of more
reliable networking protocols, the latter introduces higher link layer colli-
sions as well as making it more difficult to achieve clock synchronization.
Those differences require a new protocol design or at least, re-design ex-
isting protocols to work efficiently with underwater sensor networks.
2. The second problem relates to the difference between 2-dimensional (2-D)
and 3-dimensional (3-D) communications in underwater networks. While
the working environment in conventional sensor networks, i.e. the air,
is almost homogeneous, that of underwater environment changes with the
depth. Temperature and atmosphere change with depth when going deeper
from the sea surface, which affect the acoustic signal speed. The change of
signal speed as a signal travels through different depths bend the signal,
according to Snell’s law. Thus, the communication for underwater environ-
ment does not always follow line-of-sight model as in conventional sensor
networks. In 2-D underwater sensor networks, when all sensor nodes are
almost in the same depth, e.g. in the seabed, the communication among
sensor nodes follows in 2-D pattern with little effect due to Snell’s law.
However, when sensor nodes are placed at different depths, the communi-
cation becomes a 3-D pattern which suffers from Snell’s law. Designing a
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robust underwater sensor networks also need to take these considerations
into account.
3. The third set of problems is due to the influences of the surrounding envi-
ronment. As communication in the underwater environment is affected by
more factors than in conventional sensor networks, security and reliability
design for underwater networks also need to consider those problems.
Our Paper C is to solve reliability problems in underwater sensor networks. We
are dealing with a 3-D underwater sensor network that is affected by shadow
zones [43], which are either caused by the second or third problem mentioned
above.
1.2 Research Objectives
The principal objective of SWACOM project [62] is to analyze vulnerabilities
and develop mechanisms to provide secure and reliable services for wireless com-
munication networks. A particular focus is on securing dynamic and large scale
distributed ad hoc networks which have significant usage in both civilian and
military applications.
The project goal is to strengthen the ability of individuals and companies to
protect their information over the open air transmission. It is also to contribute
to the foundation of current research in ad hoc network technology. The project
is an interaction between issues in security, privacy protection, vulnerability and
reliability in infrastructure and communication technology.
As part of the SWACOM project, this PhD work provides contribution to meet
the project goal. More specifically, the main objectives of this PhD work are:
• Collect knowledge that forms a foundation for security and reliability in
wireless communications in general and ad hoc network communications
in particular.
• Develop solutions for providing security for wireless and ad hoc communi-
cations.
• Develop solutions for providing reliable services for wireless and ad hoc
communications.
1.3 Research Methodology
The research approach of this PhD thesis is based on literature review of re-
lated works, discussions and guidance from the academic supervisor, discussions
and co-operations with colleagues, submission and review of papers, and confer-
ence/seminar participations and presentations.
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The approach to complete each paper follows conventional research methodology
with the number of steps varying depend on paper content, including hypothesis
proposal, hypothesis testing and result analysis.
Hypothesis proposal : each paper presents a contribution to the research
topic in form of a hypothesis proposal, i.e. introduce a new idea or the
new application of existing research ideas. This hypothesis is derived from
a review of related works and is backed up by hypothesis testing and/or
analysis.
Hypothesis testing : some papers contain hypothesis testing section in which
we construct test cases to evaluate our proposed hypothesis. In Paper
C and Paper D, we use simulation to evaluate the proposed hypothesis.
The specific tools are OMNET++ for simulations and Matlab for simple
calculations and drawing figures.
Result analysis : the proposed hypotheses are compared with similar ap-
proaches. In Paper A and B, comparisons are performed by analyzing
the working principle. In other papers, Paper C and D, comparisons are
done by using the simulation results.
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Research Results
This chapter presents the results obtained during this PhD work. The chapter
starts with research contributions, where summaries and contributions of papers
in Part II are presented. Section 2.2 then provides discussions for open problems
related to the research topics, which is useful for future work beyond this PhD
thesis. Finally, Section 2.3 draws some concluding remarks after this PhD work.
2.1 Research Contributions
Research results of this PhD work are in form of paper publications in scientific
conferences and journals. Part II includes representative papers that are the
outcome of this PhD. This section presents main contributions of the included
papers, which are grouped in the same research areas. Table 2.1 represents the
focus area of each paper.
2.1.1 Secure in Wireless and Ad hoc Communications Us-
ing Identity-Based Cryptography
Paper A and B propose new applications of identity-based cryptography for
securing wireless and ad hoc communications. Though there have been vari-
ous solutions for securing such communications, the proposals in our works are
among the first that use identity-based cryptography.
As the identity of each entity is unique and can be used exclusively to differen-
tiate that entity from others, it can be used to form an encryption key to secure
communication for that entity because it inherently attaches to that entity. For
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Cellular Networks Ad hoc and Sensor Networks
Security Issues
Paper B Paper A
Paper D
Reliability Issues - Paper C
Paper A: Propose a solution for securing ZigBee network communication
using identity-based cryptography.
Paper B: Propose a solution for securing a distributed mobile payment scheme
in cellular networks using identity-based cryptography.
Paper C: Design a shadow zone aware routing algorithm to provide reliable
communications for underwater sensor networks.
Paper D: Design an energy-efficient secure multicast routing algorithm for
wireless sensor and actuator networks.
Table 2.1: Focus areas of papers in Part II.
example, a human being has many unique identities such that a social security
number, an employee number, email addresses, mobile numbers or his name in
combination with his address etc., For privacy reasons, not all identities of a
person can be exposed to the public and be used for identity-based encryption.
However, some unique identities can be used for that purpose, which makes it a
very convenient way for securing communication among entities in the commu-
nity.
Paper A extends the use of identity-based cryptography to secure ZigBee network
communication. An example application of a ZigBee network is in smart home
environments, where home devices communicate with each other for control
and monitoring home environments. Secure communication among devices is
implemented by using identity-based cryptography which uses the unique ID of
each device to form the public key for it. This is an alternative approach for
the current ZigBee security solution and may be of potential use when smart
home solutions become widely used and when the capability of devices is getting
better over time.
Paper B proposes a solution to use mobile phone number as its owner’s identity
to secure his communication. With the fact that mobile phones are becoming
indispensable devices in human daily life as well as they are getting smarter and
more powerful, we belief the use of mobile phones and mobile numbers for secure
important daily life transactions is a promising ideas and potential application
domains in the future.
The following two sections summarize the content of Paper A and B.
Paper A: ZigBee Security Using Identity-Based Cryptography
This paper presents an idea for securing communications between ZigBee net-
work devices by using identity-based cryptography with an example of smart
home environment . In this proposal, secure communication is established among
network nodes and uses node IDs as part of the encryption keys. This approach
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simplifies key management process in current ZigBee networks, reduces overhead,
resource requirements and complexity of the system by reducing the number of
keys needed, while still keeping the network secure.
Compared to current ZigBee security solution, which use a symmetric security
scheme, our approach provides the advantages of public-key cryptography with
digital signature capability and session key distribution without the interven-
tion of the key distribution center. This distribution center only needs to exist
at network setup phase. In case of node compromise, only nodes that under
the attacker’s control are affected while other nodes still function normally and
securely.
A challenging task for this solution to be practical is the capability of a ZigBee
node to work efficiently with an identity-based cryptography solution, mean-
ing that it has enough processing power to implement the security algorithms.
Some arguments mention that the use of weil pairings in current identity-based
encryption is a burden for resource-constrained devices like ZigBee equipments.
We, however, believe that the device capability will be better over time very
quickly that make this solution applicable.
Paper B: Electronic Payment Scheme Using Identity-Based Cryptog-
raphy
Our paper extends the work presented in [47] for online e-wallet system. We in-
troduce a simplified yet secure solution for such system by using identity-based
cryptography. Our proposal is not only the alternative solution for secure trans-
actions in that e-wallet system, it can also be used together with other solutions,
e.g. identity management, to provide a more convenient security management
framework to enhance human daily life.
The online e-wallet with decentralized credential keepers presented in [47] is an
architecture that allows a user to leave most of the content of his electronic wallet
at the security of his electronic keeper while travelling with his mobile phone.
For example, the user leaves his credit cards at home or at some secure locations
and access them through mobile phone when necessary. This will relieve the
user from remembering information such as PIN codes and prevents the cards
from being stolen. When the user needs to make a payment, he uses his mobile
phone to connect to his electronic keeper’s gateway and access his credentials,
e.g. credit cards, then makes the payment. The transactions are secured with
existing underlying security technology.
The model proposed in [47] has four secure links: (i) between the buyer and
seller; (ii) between the buyer and his secure server where his credentials are
kept; (iii) between the buyer secure server and the appropriate credit card is-
suers/banks; (iv) between the seller and his banks. Security solutions for the
last two links are well-established and are not discussed in the paper. Security
for the first two links used public-key cryptography, as mentioned in [47].
Our work propose a solution to replace the use of public-key cryptography be-
tween the buyer and the seller by using identity-based cryptography. As we
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
24 Research Results
discussed earlier, this approach simplifies the key exchange process, especially
when communication parties are human beings. For example, the buyer can eas-
ily verify the seller identity information, which is also his key, if this information
is the seller’s registered number appeared on the payment counter.
This security solution can be extended to work with the buyer’s multiple creden-
tial keepers, each of which can hold information for some of the buyer’s payment
credentials. Secure communications between the buyer and those keepers can
be done using identity-based cryptography via GPRS link of his mobile phone
or event with SMS. The credential keepers can also be service providers instead
of the home gateway as proposed in the paper.
2.1.2 Security and Reliability in Sensor Networks
Security and reliability issues in sensor networks are addressed in our Paper C
and D. We focus on routing problems in sensor networks. Paper C proposes a
novel solution to tackle the shadow zone phenomenon that is inherent in under-
water environments. The proposed solution improved reliability and availability
in underwater sensor network communication. Paper D introduces a new solu-
tion for secure multicast routing in wireless sensor and actuator networks. It
helps to reduce energy consumption while keeping the communication among
the network nodes secure.
The following two sections summarize the content of Paper C and D.
Paper C: A Shadow Zone Aware Routing Protocol for Undersea Acous-
tic Sensor Nodes with Power Controlled and Movable Transducer
This paper presents a novel solution to tackle shadow zone problems to increase
reliability and availability in underwater sensor network communications. Due
to the characteristics of underwater environments, signals transmitted between
different depths are bended as the consequence of changing velocity. This bend-
ing of signals when travelling might create shadow zones. A shadow zone in
respect to one signal source is the area where signals from that source cannot
reach due to signal bending, even though that area is within line-of-sight and
coverage of that signal source. Another reason that creates shadow zones is the
presence water masses with different temperatures, which sometimes appear in
the underwater environment. Those water masses also cause signal transmission
changed or disrupted. The presence of shadow zones makes communication in
a underwater sensor network disrupted and thus, affects the performance of the
network.
Our work presented in Paper C addresses this shadow zone problem by proposing
a scheme in which disconnected sensor nodes in a shadow zone can actively move
out of that shadow zone to re-establish connection and thus, keeping network
connections going through them alive. To guarantee that a sensing task is still
performed in that shadow zone area, we introduce a new design of sensor nodes,
in which the sensing module and communication module are separated. In the
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case that movement is needed, a sensor node only moves its communication
module out of a shadow zone.
Simulations have been done to evaluate the performance of our scheme. Since our
proposal is the first one that tackles the shadow zone phenomenon, no similar
scheme is available to compare. We, therefore, compare our scheme with an
existing one that is not shadow zone aware. The performance evaluation shows
that our scheme provides higher network connectivity, higher event delivery ratio
and smaller packet delay compared to the other one.
Paper D: A Secure Many to Many Routing Protocol for Wireless
Sensor and Actuator Networks
This paper proposes a solution for secure multicast routing in sensor and actuator
networks. The work uses authenticated broadcast to prevent malicious nodes
from injecting incorrect routing information. Our work particularly focuses on
optimizing energy consumption of network nodes and prolonging nodes life time.
This work is among the first that address secure multicast routing in sensor
networks and is possibly the first proposal for secure multicast routing in sensor
and actuator networks.
In our work, the network model is represented by a base station, a number of
event sources, actuators and sensor nodes. There are also a number of events and
each actuator is interested in more than one events. Each actuator broadcasts
its interested events and network nodes form registration and routing tables
based on the messages received from actuators. Nodes send interested events to
the registered actuators using secure multicast communications, thus reduce the
energy consumption per event. The security of our protocol relies on existing
security solutions. For example, the authenticated broadcast presented in [53]
is used for interest disseminations and key pre-distribution schemes presented
in [14], [21], [41] or [53] are used to secure pair-wise communications between
nodes.
2.2 Open Problems
The works presented in this thesis are not fully complete and still open for further
research. The following parts show open areas where further research can be
done. The first two problems relate to our work in identity-based cryptography
while the last two relate to our work in underwater sensor networks.
Complete Identity-based Cryptography Solution The works in our Pa-
per A and B are not complete. Possible extensions of those works can be de-
velopments of complete solutions for those ideas. A prototype for mobile pay-
ment application, for example, can be develop with the support from PDAs and
WLANs. A real prototype based one real working conditions is also a possible
future research.
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Identity-based Cryptography and Identity Management Identity man-
agement is a broad area related to provide, manage and control the identity of
entities, e.g. human beings. The goal of identity management is to provide ap-
propriate services/resources to appropriate entities. Beside social aspects, iden-
tity management, in security perspective, is a lot more related to access control.
Thus, the combination of identity management and identity-based cryptogra-
phy can be an ideal candidate to provide a good secure identity management
solution.
Modeling of Shadow Zone in Underwater Environment Shadow zones
can be the results of signal bending when they travel through different depths. A
ray tracing model [43] can be used to calculate shadow zones in this case. How-
ever, there is currently no tool for modeling shadow zones caused by thermal
zones, i.e. the water masses with different temperature compare to the surround-
ing environment. There is not much information in the literature to model the
second kind of shadow zones, which has more influences in underwater sensor
network applications. Finding a good model or a good estimation of that model
will greatly improve our current solution, which uses simply model to represent
shadow zones.
Cooperative Solution to Avoid Shadow Zone In our current solution,
network nodes react independently to avoid shadow zone. Though this approach
increase network reliability and availability, this approach is not the optimal way.
For example, there might be a case when two nodes in each other communication
range lost connections and start moving at the same time to different directions.
While one node may re-establish connection, the other node might not. In this
case, there might be a better solution if only one node moves and the other
remains unchanged provided that they are still in the communication range of
each other. Another example is network partitioning. In this case, not all the
nodes in the disconnected partition need to move to re-establish the connections.
Cooperation between nodes for finding the optimal solution to avoid shadow
zones is still a challenging problem.
2.3 Conclusion
This PhD work is part of “Secure and Reliable Wireless and Ad hoc Commu-
nications” (SWACOM) project under VERDIKT program. The main research
focus of this thesis are on two different domains yet relate to the research theme
of the project.
Our work in identity-based cryptography proposes two applications of identity-
based cryptography to secure network communications. The first proposal is a
solution for securing communications among ZigBee used for control and mon-
itoring applications. The second one is a proposal to secure distributed mobile
payment scheme, which provide both security and convenience for the end users.
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The research in this thesis is also working toward securing and providing reli-
able communications for sensor networks, including underwater sensors. We also
have two contributions in this working domain. Our work proposes a new routing
scheme that tackles shadow zone phenomenon in underwater sensor networks.
This scheme improves reliability and availability for underwater sensor appli-
cations. Beside the research on underwater sensor networks, we also propose
a new solution for energy-efficient secure multicast communication in actuator
and sensor networks. This proposal aims at reducing energy consumption while
still maintains network security.
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